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ABSTRACT 
How NGOs craft accountability and legitimacy in authoritarian states is poorly 
understood. We put forward a framework of analysis for capturing the processes of 
making accountability and legitimacy. We introduce the ideas of first and second-order 
accountability and stocks of accountability capital. In authoritarian regimes, building 
second-order accountability through the accumulation of stocks of accountability is 
crucial for NGOs’ survival and organisational development and as a path towards 
gaining first-order accountability. Drawing on a decade of field-work on child welfare 
NGOs in China from 2007-2017, we select three case-studies with long operational 
trajectories to illustrate processes of crafting legitimacy and accountability. The 
research contributes empirically and theoretically to the understanding of accountability 
in NGOs in authoritarian states through the novel analytic framework and case-study of 
China. 
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Accountability is hard for NGOs to build but easily broken. The sexual exploitation 
scandal engulfing Oxfam and Save the Children in early 2018 and the subsequent loss 
of public confidence and funds testify to this (International Development Committee 
2018).  Building effective accountability systems is vital for ensuring legitimacy claims 
are upheld and that service delivery failures are avoided (World Bank 2004). Whilst in 
liberal democracies legitimacy is particularly important for newly founded NGOs, or for 
legitimacy repair as with Oxfam (Suchman, 1995), in authoritarian regimes this is often 
even more crucial given the constant shadow of state control and the relative newness of 
the concept of NGOs. In authoritarian contexts the capacity of NGOs to build 
accountability that bolsters their legitimacy amongst donors, government and the public 
can be crucial to their survival and growth. Yet the salience and processes of building 





It is argued that in authoritarian regimes like China, NGOs often face 
considerable barriers to gaining and maintaining legal status as registered social 
organisations, which would entitle them to engage in first-order accountability 
processes arising out of registration. Instead they build ‘second-order’ accountability 
through the incremental, ongoing accumulation of stocks of accountability capital, 
which is crucial for their legitimacy, survival and organisational development. This 
second-order accountability compensates for a lack of opportunities for first-order 
accountability afforded to registered social organisations. It matters for attracting donors 
and service users as respectively alternative funding sources and as a support base. 
Whilst in democratic societies, second-order accountability is also important for 
maintaining legitimacy, in authoritarian regimes it also serves as a path to achieving 
first-order accountability. It also matters for registered NGOs to maintain their legal 
status. This is not just because legal status is discretionary and subject to political 
winds, but also because it does not address all dimensions of accountability such as 
professional, user and democratic accountabilities.  Both first-order and second-order 
accountability rely on formal accountability processes such as funder and auditing 
reports and informal accountability processes such as positive media coverage and 
informal government recognition. 
The article begins with a theoretical overview of the literature on NGOs, 
accountability and legitimacy, highlighting the gaps on authoritarian regimes and the 
barriers facing NGOs in crafting accountability and fostering legitimacy. It then puts 
forward an analytic framework for capturing the processes whereby NGOs in an 
authoritarian regime such as China accumulate stocks of accountability capital and use 
these to justify their claims to legitimacy. In doing so, it does not seek to prove direct 
causality between particular accountability strategies and outcomes, not only because of 
the methodological difficulty of proving attribution but also because actual outcomes 
are shaped by multiple contextual factors such as political economy and the history of 
civil society-state relations. It then illustrates these processes through reference to three 
case-studies of child welfare groups. It concludes by drawing together key findings and 
considering the theoretical contribution of the analysis. 
Theoretical background  




invokes key questions around who can demand accountability, from whom, for what, 
and how. When applied to NGOs, the analysis of accountability becomes complex as 
there are multiple actors with varying power to seek accountability and enforce 
sanctions (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Najam 1996; Willems and Van Dooren 2007). 
These actors include central and local government, institutional and individual donors, 
international development agencies, service users, NGO staff and the general public 
(Willems and Van Dooren 2007). Furthermore, accountability is multi-dimensional 
(Mattei 2009), covering financial, managerial, professional, societal, democratic and 
user accountability. The uneven power relations between different actors demanding 
accountability in turn lead to hierarchies of accountability, whereby certain dimensions 
of accountability are prioritised over others (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, Mattei 2009).  
The ideas of accountability and legitimacy are closely related, though they are 
often discussed as separate concepts and mainly pertain to governments, yielding 
discrete sub-fields of literature (Alagappa 1995; Holbig 2013; Kailitz 2013). As 
Suchman (1995) suggests, legitimacy encompasses both evaluative and cognitive 
dimensions: ‘Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some social constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’. This definition allows both for contextual 
variations in norms and values, and the public’s and government’s perceptions of 
NGOs. These are particularly pertinent in rapidly changing socio-economic contexts 
such as China, where public and government mistrust of NGOs prevails and norms and 
values are shifting (Lu 2009). Though accountability can bolster legitimacy by 
supporting claims made, the interrelations between the two concepts can also be 
problematic. Not all accountability fosters legitimacy claims whilst factors other than 
accountability can also bolster legitimacy. In some contexts gaining legitimacy from the 
government could weaken public trust in NGOs where governments are seen as corrupt 
(Morcol and Muducamura 2014). Where NGOs are relatively unknown, as in China, 
government approval of an NGO, even informal, can be reassuring to the public and 
donors (Lu 2009). Foreign support to NGOs can bolster the legitimacy of NGOs in the 
public’s eyes but weaken it from the government’s perspective. Just as accountability 
systems can favour particular dimensions of accountability, so too can they favour 
gaining the legitimacy of more powerful actors over others.  
With the exponential growth and influence of NGOs from the 1990s mounting 




accountability and legitimacy of NGOs, predominantly in democratic regimes, 
(Bebbington et al 2008; Bendell and Cox 2006; Edele 2005; Scholte 2011). This yielded 
numerous typologies of accountability, highlighted the multi-dimensionality of 
accountability and generated numerous practical manuals and reports dedicated to 
evaluation and monitoring (Atack 1999; Charnovitz 2007; Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and 
Hulme 1995; Douthwaite et al 2006; Mattei 2009; Kilby 2006). It also stimulated 
research on the importance of participation and empowerment for realising user 
accountability (Bovaird 2007; Brett 2003; Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Speer 2012; 
World Bank 2004). However, there remain significant gaps in the literature, namely, 
insufficient attention to the relationship between accountability and legitimacy, the 
processes of building accountability, and NGO accountability and legitimacy in 
authoritarian regimes.   
First, in the field of NGOs the relationship between accountability and 
legitimacy claims is under-theorised. Accountability gives substance to legitimacy 
claims by providing evidence. As Hilhorst (2003: 128) notes in her ethnography of 
NGOs in the Philippines, accountability is a ‘device for legitimation’. NGOs’ 
legitimacy to provide services, advocate, or influence policy rests on their multitude of 
claims. These might include claims of being value-based organisations, professional, 
competent and well governed. Accountability mechanisms such as financial auditing, 
reporting, staff appraisal and user feedback channels are some of the formal 
accountability processes used to justify and monitor NGOs’ legitimacy claims. 
However, as Joshi (2013: S30-33; S44-45) argues in her review of accountability 
initiatives, not only is there limited evidence of the direct links between accountability 
initiatives and impact of services, but the multiplicity of historical, political and social 
factors shaping accountability make direct attribution difficult. 
Second, there is a paucity of empirical research on the processes of building 
accountability and how these shape accountability dimensions that are prioritised. 
Accountability processes lead to hierarchies of accountability, with typically financial 
and managerial accountability taking precedence over democratic or user 
accountability. Multiple stakeholders making demands for accountability have varying 
degrees of power and means to sanction, with donors’ interests tending to prevail over 
less organised stakeholders such as users (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Kilby 2006). These 
power relations in turn are infused with norms and values that combine to marginalise 




process with consequences for accountability hierarchies and the legitimacy endowed 
by different actors.  
The third gap in the literature concerns the dearth of theoretical and empirical 
research on NGO accountability and legitimacy in authoritarian regimes. In most 
conventional treatment, accountability relates to liberal democratic governments, 
citizens and electoral processes (Anderson 2009; Atack 1999; Goetz and Jenkins 2005). 
However, authoritarian regimes have specific features that pose particular challenges to 
accountability and legitimacy and require a different analytic approach. Unlike liberal 
democracies, authoritarian regimes lack key ex-ante elements for realising 
accountability (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Brooker 2000; Gandhi 2008; Ma 2009; 
Wintrobe 1998). Typically, they lack judicial independence, have weaker civil societies, 
government-controlled media, and poor transparency. Citizens’ civil and political rights 
to freedom of expression and association lack constitutional guarantees (Cassani 2017; 
Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017). The regulatory environment governing NGOs is 
typically highly restrictive and discretionary (ICNL 2016). Unregistered civic groups 
are at constant risk of surveillance and closure, thwarting their development. 
Authoritarian regimes also often lack intermediary organisations that liaise and 
negotiate with government and develop self-regulation mechanisms. This institutional 
fabric not only affects citizens’ ability to hold governments to account, but also the 
context within which NGOs can develop accountability and legitimacy (Burnell 2006).  
Finally, NGOs operate in an environment of general repression, subject to 
ongoing harassment by security agencies and potential closure. Unregistered groups are 
often forced underground, or if operating at the surface, have a limited life-span and 
scale. Even if they do achieve legal status, their situation remains vulnerable to 
changing government policies, political winds and episodic crack-downs on NGOs. In 
the past 15 years various countries, democratic and non-democratic, such as Russia, 
India, Hungary, Egypt and China have tightened their controls over foreign funding to 
NGOs, fearing that such support could destabilise their governments (Dauce 2014; 
Dupuy et al, 2016; ICNL 2016; Howell 2015; Shieh 2017). Maintaining accountability 
and legitimacy through second-order accountability remains crucial to the continuing 
registration and survival of NGOs, whether registered or not.   
These features of authoritarianism apply to China, with implications for 
accountability processes. First, China lacks a civil society sufficiently confident in its 




independent legal system guaranteeing civil and political rights (Edele 2005; White et al 
1996). In the last decade, the spread of social media and new technologies has enabled 
citizens to exchange non-official information, comment on public issues and expose 
state corruption (Ma 2012; Xu 2012; Yang 2006). However, the state is quick to censor 
information through firewalls and other means. China thus lacks the expected liberal 
democratic pre-conditions for realising accountability.  
Despite this, it is often asserted that China has many unregistered NGOs and 
civic groups above-county level providing services, legal advice and rights-based work 
that far outnumber registered organisations (Wang and Sun 2010)i. Unregistered groups 
operated in legal limbo for several decades and were constantly at risk of potential 
closure due to lack of legal registration. The growth of unregistered citizens’ groups, 
particularly during the Hu-Wen regime, was partly due to insufficient state capacity to 
monitor and contain NGOs, partly due to the emergence of new needs for services not 
yet covered by registered organisations, but also because of instrumental benefits that 
local officials derive from NGOs (Howell 2019). These include filling gaps in welfare 
provision or gaining information about citizens’ preferences and grievances, especially 
important given the information deficit that bedevils authoritarian states. But it also 
reflects NGO survival strategies, including processes of accountability-building that 
remain an under-researched dimension. 
Second, the legal and regulatory environment in China is highly constrictive. 
The 1998 Regulations on the Management and Registration of Social Organisations 
establish specific requirements rendering it difficult for NGOs to register and develop 
organisationally (Saich 2000). In particular the requirement that NGOs identify a 
supervisory government unit to oversee their work has severely limited the opportunity 
to register (Hildebrandt 2013; Lu 2009). Government officials concerned about their 
promotion are reluctant to take responsibility for an NGO, fearing that any potential 
criminal activity or anti-government agenda could negatively affect their careers. 
Though these Regulations were amended in 2013 to facilitate the registration of certain 
types of NGOs such as charities to deliver services, there remain considerable barriers 
to registrationii. For example, according to Article 3, each location can only have one 
organisation per domain such as environmental education or poverty alleviation, thus 
restricting the pluralisation of NGOs (Howell 2003). Similarly, Article 19 stipulates that 
NGOs can only operate within a defined territory, thus preventing their co-ordinated 




Finally, Chinese NGOs operate in a repressive political context, the contours of 
which can vary regionally and across time. During Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s office 
(2002-2012) NGOs grew rapidly in number (Wang and Sun 2010), branching into new 
areas of activities and addressing marginalised interests (Howell 2003; Teets 2009; 
Wilson 2015). Those working in sensitive areas such as migrant workers or rights issues 
operated in the interstices of legality, subject to ongoing harassment, but still negotiated 
hurdles to provide legal advice, services and advocacy (Chan 2012; Cheng et al 2010; 
Xu 2013). Though some NGOs registered as companies to avoid restrictive regulations, 
they were still subject to closure as technically they were non-profit-making agencies. 
This was a decade where in general associational life blossomed (Howell and Duckett 
2019; Lam 2006).  
This was to change under the new leadership of Xi Jinping, when in 2015 a 
wave of suppression targeted feminists, activist lawyers, and migrant workers’ rights 
groups, triggering the most sustained period of repression since 1989. This was 
followed in 2016 with the passing of a Foreign NGOs Management Law that tightly 
controlled the inflow of foreign funds to domestic groups (Shieh 2017). Those NGOs 
that adopt a rights-based approach, touch on sensitive issues or are perceived to have 
anti-regime agendas, are particularly vulnerable to surveillance and coercion. 
Furthermore, under the Xi administration, there has been a determined move to require 
registered NGOs to establish a party cell, pointing to a further encapsulation of society 
by the Party. These changes are likely to reduce the survival prospects of unregistered 
organisations.  
However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not wholly suppressed civic 
groups, as it has also come to recognise the instrumental benefits of some NGOs to the 
state. Thus NGO-state relations incorporate complex and subtle processes of negotiating 
spaces and resources for mutual interests (White et al 1996; Saich 2000). Whilst the 
state can be repressive, NGOs also depend on the state for access to material resources, 
policy implementation, state protection and information (Lu 1999: 58-77). The CCP has 
adopted a two-pronged welfarist incorporation strategy towards civil society – on the 
one hand suppressing those parts it considers threatening, whilst incorporating others 
deemed instrumentally useful in welfare reforms and gathering information about 
citizens’ preferences. This dualistic approach towards NGOs is reflected in the 2013 
Decision of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCPiii, calling for 




social organisations, thus expanding the supply of providers (Howell 2015). Subsequent 
pilots exposed the weakness of governance, accountability and organisational systems 
in NGOs.  This stimulated debates around the need to ‘professionalise’ NGOs by 
improving their accountability and governance (Deng 2003; Li 2003; Li and Hou 2009; 
Liu 2008).  
These particular features of authoritarian regimes create a different dynamic for 
NGOs in constructing accountability and strengthening legitimacy. In authoritarian 
regimes empirical analysis of accountability is crucial to understanding the survival and 
development of NGOs. To this end this article offers a generic framework of analysis as 
a starting-point for capturing the processes underpinning NGO accountability and 
legitimacy in an authoritarian regime.  This framework emerges out of the empirical 
fieldwork conducted in Chinaiv.  
 
Framework of analysis  
This section introduces the generic framework and the concepts of first- and second-
order accountability and accountability capital. Table 1 summarises the key elements. 
NGOs engage in first- and second-order accountability processes that create stocks of 
accountability capital. These serve as evidence for NGO legitimacy claims, to which 
they can be held to account. Making accountability is a dynamic process that is 
performed repeatedly.  
The precise combination of elements and the relative weighting given to certain 
processes is likely to differ between democratic and authoritarian regimes, reflecting the 
distinctive features of authoritarianism. Thus, compared to a democratic regime, an 
authoritarian state may involve greater attention to gaining the trust of government 
officials, who because of less judicial independence, are more able to wield discretion 
and stymie civil society organisations. Furthermore, we can expect greater attention to 
highlighting the services dimension of organisations as opposed to rights. Similarly, 
because of weak civil societies, nurturing public trust through media coverage and 
display of activities is also likely to be more significant in authoritarian regimes. Also, 
as authoritarian regimes have more restrictive legal frameworks governing civil society, 
we can expect considerable efforts to be made to court government officials so as to 
register. First-order accountability is thus more salient for the survival and development 




However, precisely how different elements combine will vary according to 
context as both authoritarian and democratic regimes vary in the depth of their 
authoritarianism/democracy, their hybridity and the historical trajectory of state-civil 
society relations. Whilst all NGOs have to constantly maintain their legitimacy and 
accountability, in newly democratising regimes or for NGOs undergoing legitimacy 
repair (Suchman 1995), there is likely as in authoritarian regimes to be greater attention 






































































































In authoritarian states a restrictive regulatory environment creates barriers to 
legal status through NGO registration (Dauce 2014; ICNL 2016). Legal status demands 
first-order accountability as the NGO is answerable to state laws and politico-
bureaucratic accountability demands through formal accountability processes. Such 
status can endow the organisation with governmental and public confidence, and for 
child welfare organisations in China, enables access to various policies that benefit 
children in their care (Shang and Fisher 2014). Legal status and the associated first-
order accountability is not available to all NGOs, nor is it sufficient to ensure full 
accountability. Demands for professional, user or democratic accountability tend to rely 
instead on second-order accountability.  
Crafting second-order accountability is crucial to NGO survival and 
organisational growth in democratic and authoritarian contexts. However, in 
authoritarian regimes these processes are particularly salient given many NGOs lack 
legal status and face other threats to their continued existence. Even for registered 
NGOs, reproducing their legitimacy through second-order accountability can be 
essential for continued survival. These processes include positive media coverage; 
informal government recognition through visits by government delegations, awards, 
financial and/or in-kind support; demonstration of professionalism and service 
provision, as opposed to activism and rights; transparent processes such as publicising 
reports, evaluations, and budgetary information; and participatory processes such as 
involving users in activities. 
Just as social capital contributes to building civil society (Putnam 1993), so too 
accountability capital contributes to NGO legitimacy claims. Stocks of accountability 
capital gained from first and second-order accountability processes include both formal 
and informal elements, which can be leveraged as evidence to justify legitimacy claims. 
Formal elements include auditing reports, donor reports, independent evaluations, 
annual reports, feedback mechanisms and accountability structures linking to multiple 
stakeholders along with appropriate sanctions and rewards. Informal elements are 
evidence that can be leveraged to support claims to be professional, efficient, well 
governed, caring, and honest. Generally, these are the activities associated with second-
order accountability. These informal accountability processes make available 
information that can be used for seeking and providing accountability.  
In an authoritarian context, these stocks of accountability capital from formal 




users and seek donor support, and to gain first-order accountability.  An NGO that has 
attracted donor funding suggests that donors have sufficient confidence in the 
organisation to risk their money and reputation. Having in place governance structures, 
managerial systems with clear specifications and obligations, and requirements for 
professional skills development signals to government, the public and funders that an 
NGO has organisational capacity. An NGO that has developed a large user base, often 
through referral, suggests sufficient trust in the organisation by the referring 
organisation.  
These stocks of accountability capital from second-order accountability 
processes are ways through which the organisation can invite accountability with or 
without legal status. Through varied formal and informal accountability performances 
of an NGO demonstrates that ‘I intend to be accountable to you’ and that ‘I am a 
legitimate provider’. Accountability, as Hilhorst (2003) argued, can thus be a device for 
legitimation.  
There is thus a simultaneous and overlapping flow of activities that NGOs 
undertake to create inputs supporting legitimacy claims and leading to positive 
outcomes for the NGO, as seen in the ideal type in Figure 1. Where NGOs cannot 
produce sufficient evidence or become exposed for poor practice, then the outcomes 
affect their ability to maintain legitimacy claims. In this circular flow NGOs make 
claims to be legitimate actors in the welfare field. They not only establish formal first-
order processes of accountability but also build reputation to nurture government 
support, attract donors and service users. For NGOs that strive to be transparent and 
open second-order accountability is an alternative, supplementary way of informing the 
public, potential donors and service-users about their work, who can then follow up the 
information to validate claims.  
Put here: Figure 1:  Building accountability and legitimacy  
 
Whilst these processes have to be constantly reproduced, they also take place in a 
broader set of politics relating to state-NGO, national-international and stakeholder 
relations (Figure 2). State-NGO politics can involve a politics of divide and rule 
whereby certain NGOs are tolerated, even courted by the state and others are subject to 
constant scrutiny. Where courted, state-NGO politics, too, centre around areas of shared 




national governments to curtail the influence of foreign agencies suspected of 
harbouring anti-regime agendas (Dupuy et al 2016; ICNL 2016). However, these 
politics have to be balanced against the benefits of international engagement such as 
access to advanced scientific knowledge and expertise and exposure to best 
international practices. Stakeholder politics concerns the varying powers of different 
actors which enable them to demand and enforce accountability and impose sanctions. 
Organised actors such as development agencies and governments leverage greater 
power than unorganised and marginalised groups such as children, poor women or 
stigmatised populations. Added to this, changes in the constraints and opportunities for 
NGOs can alter how NGOs go about building accountability, such as changes in 
leadership or in regulations. 
 
Put here: Figure 2: Factors shaping processes of crafting accountability and legitimacy 
 
Some stocks of accountability capital are more relevant to some account-
providers than others, though this will vary according to context. For example, open 
days for the public are a way to demonstrate to the public that they are efficient and 
professional organisations, contributing to their public legitimacy. They can also serve 
as evidence to donors that the organisation acts upon claims to be participatory. 
Similarly, evidence of professional training supports legitimacy claims around 
professional service provision, enhancing legitimacy in the eyes of users and donors. It 
is difficult, however, to always provide a one-to-one link between certain accountability 
capital and the targeted accountability-demander or endower of legitimacy, as 
accountability in NGOs is both multi-directional and multi-dimensional (Joshi 2013, 
Mattei 2009). Being accountable along one dimension more than another - such as 
financial accountability versus user accountability – may bolster or weaken the power 
of different actors demanding account (Kilby 2006; Mattei 2009; Leung 2008). The 
framework thus provides for a general relationship but the specific dynamics have to be 
investigated through particular contexts.  
Case studies 
This section illustrates the application of this framework with three cases of child 




legitimacy, enabling them to develop organisationally despite the considerable barriers. 
The analysis does not aim to evaluate the accountability processes, nor investigate in-
depth their political contours. The goal is more modest: to illustrate the processes of 
accountability-building that can be leveraged for legitimacy claims. 
The research draws upon a decade of fieldwork in China from 2007-2017 
involving semi-structured interviews in 88 organisations, focus groups, observation of 
their operations and in-depth case-studies of the selected organisations. A preliminary 
compilation of a data-set of 188 child welfare organisations provided a sample frame for 
interviewing organisations operating in various locationsv and for in-depth study of 
organisations with relatively well developed accountability processes and long 
operational trajectoriesvi.  They operated in Beijing City, Henan, Hubei and Guangxi 
provinces where the fieldwork was conducted between 2008 and 2010, with follow-up 
visits and documentary research up till 2017vii.  Findings were triangulated with 
analyses of policy documents, grey and secondary literature, forming the basis for the 
development of the analytic framework. 
The three illustrative case here and the locations where they operated were 
selected not for their representativeness but because their longer operational trajectory 
allows us to trace the processes through which they have established more robust 
accountability systems compared to recently established NGOs in the sample. Indeed, 
one of these had cared for orphans for many years, but could not register as a child 
welfare organisation. Like most case-studies, they aim to illustrate the textured 
processes of change that large-scale quantitative research tends not to capture and do 
not claim generalisability (Gerring 2007). They reflect varying backgrounds, constraints 
and routes to accumulating stocks of accountability capital and achieving legitimacy.  
Most child welfare NGOs in China have evolved since 2002 with the expansion 
of associational life during the Hu-Wen period, filling significant gaps in state provision 
(Shang et al 2005). The majority are unregistered and in the early stages of 
development, with rudimentary systems of accountability. Child welfare NGOs working 
with orphaned or abandoned children face stricter requirements than most NGOs as they 
have to obtain permission from three agencies and co-operate with and meet the 
requirements of relevant state institutions (Shang and Fisher 2014). Crafting 
accountability has been even more crucial for them in gaining legitimacy amongst 
government officials and the public, attracting donors and developing a market of 




The three cases are Liming Family, Angel House and Children’s Hope 
Foundation. Liming Family is a faith-based, non-governmental child welfare 
organisation in Hebei province that has operated as an unregistered orphanage for over 
30 years, gaining a national reputationviii. With 32 full-time staff and many volunteers it 
provides services such as caring for abandoned and orphaned children, adoption, and 
rehabilitation services for children with disabilities. As a religious organisation, it faced 
particular constraints related to government suspicion of its purposes and activities. It 
thus has had to do considerable second-order accountability work to allay government 
suspicion. Nevertheless through careful navigation of government relations it gained the 
confidence of local officials aware of significant gaps in welfare provision and 
pioneered a national network to advance a professional approach to child welfare. With 
dogged determination, including submitting over 100 petition letters to government 
departments, it pressed for legal status that would enable citizen rights to the children in 
its care, such as access to education, residential status and various benefits. Though it 
finally registered in 2013 as a disability services organisation, it could not register to 
care for orphans.   
Angel House was initiated by the parents of children with cerebral palsy. Our 
survey revealed that 30 per cent of all registered child welfare organisations were 
founded by parents of children with disabilities. Located in Guangxi province, Angel 
House’s 25 staff provide services such as rehabilitation and vocational training. 
Accumulating stocks of accountability capital was crucial to bolstering legitimacy 
amongst the government and public, expanding its client base, attracting funding and 
gaining state protection. International professional organisations proved pivotal in 
strengthening its professional capacities and introducing best international practice. 
Close to its users, there were stronger incentives to ensure that care was well provided. 
With direct user participation, the opportunities for informal feedback supplemented its 
formal mechanisms of accountability. Though it preferred to register as a child welfare 
organisation offering children certain rights, it could only register as a people’s run non-
profit enterprise for services to children with disabilities. Its situation was still 
precarious as legal status could always be revoked if it lost favour with government 
officials. 
The third case is Children’s Hope Foundation in Henan province which transited 
from a hybrid organisation, both quasi-governmental and quasi-non-governmental, and 




foundation. As a semi-governmental organisation under Association Bix, it started from 
an advantageous position as this affiliation endowed it with legal status. However, in 
seeking to become a fully independent foundation, it had to restock accountability 
capital to survive. After registration as an independent foundation in 2010, it continued 
to work in foster care, running homes and facilitating access to health care for children 
with disabilities. By 2017 it had a staff of 30.  
Having outlined the case-studies, we now use the framework to analyse 
processes for developing stocks of accountability capital to leverage legitimacy claims. 
From their documentation, mission statements and interviews, the three cases presented 
multiple sources of legitimacy relating to values, professionalism and governance. For 
example, Liming Family emphasised its ‘loving’ approach and professionalism, whilst 
Angel House underlined values of care and love, its principled commitment to user 
participation and professionalism. Children’s Hope Foundation presented itself as a 
professional, value-based organisation, with a ‘loving heart’ and ‘spirit of devotion’, 
deriving from its Christian ethos.  
Developing formal and informal elements of second-order accountability was 
important for unregistered and registered NGOs to gain and maintain government and 
public trust, attract donor funding and service users. Apart from longer established 
NGOs, most NGOs in our study lacked formal accountability processes, such as a 
governing board, annual reports to institutionalised donors, and internal systems such as 
job specifications and appraisals. In contrast, Liming Family, established a council of 
members from the church, enterprises, staff, academics and social workers and provided 
an annual report, work plan and financial statement to church authorities.  
Angel House, guided by an international donor, invested considerable energy in 
formalising and professionalising the organisation. The newly independent Children’s 
Hope Foundation was aware that being efficiently organised was crucial to gaining 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public and government. It set in place formal systems for 
greater oversight and efficiency, such as organisational objectives and structure, a 
board, five-year plan, financial procedures, and provided financial and audit reports to 
institutional donors and advisory council. Its registration as a people’s run non-
enterprise unit (minban feiyingli danwei, 民办非营利单位), required annual 
government inspections and audits, though these were not focussed on professional or 




develop professional capacity through staff training. Parents received an annual child 
assessment report to monitor their child’s progress. 
Apart from these formal mechanisms aimed at the accountability demands of 
government and donors, the NGOs also invested in informal processes that yielded 
evidence to be leveraged in support of legitimacy claims. Liming Family used multiple 
ways to enhance its visibility, solicit funds from the expanding private sector and 
strengthen its legitimacy. It organised open days for the general public, built 
partnerships with local businesses and institutions, received local social work students 
for practical assignments, and mobilised the local community to donate time and in-kind 
support. It nurtured relations with local media and deployed official festive days to 
press local government officials to grant it registration and to advocate for the inclusion 
of people with disabilities in the community.  
It also welcomed government delegations to the orphanage, using this 
opportunity to press for various policy benefits, which their lack of legal status denied 
them, such as the Five Guarantees allowance, orphan’s allowance, and access to local 
schools for children in its care. Indeed, local officials boosted their own credentials by 
steering high-level visits to the orphanage because of its reputation for relatively 
professional care.  Such governmental visits signalled informal approval of their work, 
which was important for legitimacy in the public’s and users’ eyes. Whilst the local 
government did not allow Liming Family to register as a child welfare institution, it 
nevertheless condoned its operation, partly because it did not want to assume 
responsibility for the children, some of whom came from other provinces for which the 
local government did not receive any funding. However, such gains were discretionary. 
For example, having negotiated special case status for adoption purposes, this was later 
overturned when the local government leadership changed, thus necessitating the re-
building of legitimacy.   
Angel House also deployed a combination of accountability capital to gain 
legitimacy with the government and public and attract funding by demonstrating its 
strong emphasis on professionalism and user participation. It placed financial reports on 
its website, with information about services and costs. Its transparency extended to 
adopting an open-door approach to users. As parents commented, being invited into the 
centre to observe their children’s rehabilitation, learning to apply some techniques 




As the Director’s spouse was a journalist, Angel House was able to mobilise 
media contacts and promote a favourable public image of its professional approach and 
user-focus to which it could be held to account. Like Liming Family, it cultivated wider 
links with individuals and businesses, some of which donated funds, thus gradually 
bolstering its legitimacy. Its emphasis on user participation gained the confidence of 
parents, who through everyday encounters with staff could give feedback, query 
practice, and informally seek explanations of what was being done and why. The 
continuing emphasis on professional expertise was important not just for building staff 
capacity but also for enhancing its reputation for professionalism. As a key founder of a 
nation-wide cerebral palsy learning website, it established a reputation beyond Guangxi 
province, justifying further its legitimacy as a child welfare provider. 
Part of Angel House’s success in maintaining registration lay in constant efforts 
to foster positive relations with local government. Though it had benefited from being 
one of the first registered disability NGOs in the province, it still had to work hard at 
maintaining government trust, building its stock of accountability capital. As it grew in 
scale and reputation, it received a raft of government awards and praise from officials 
for its achievements. The accumulation of such symbolic inputs added to their stock of 
accountability and bolstered their legitimacy amongst donors and the public, attracting 
funding and service users.  
Compared to Liming Family and Angel House, the Children’s Hope Foundation 
was in an advantageous position when steering its route to independence as it already 
had a stock of accountability. It harnessed its close relationships with government 
officials, international connections, exposure to international best practice, and local and 
regional networks, to claim legitimacy as a child welfare organisation. However, to 
raise funds and maintain legitimacy with the public, government and private sector, it 
also had to restock accountability capital by developing new second-order 
accountability.  
As well as strengthening formal governance mechanisms, it focussed on 
transparency, public image and displays of professionalism. It used its website to 
enhance visibility and promote a public image as a well governed, valued-base NGO. 
By placing audit and annual reports on its website it demonstrated transparency. It 
publicised its work in the media to develop its public reputation as a competent welfare 
agency. It highlighted cases of children who needed surgery to attract donations from 




The need for more work to improve accountability, such as better monitoring 
processes, elimination of potential conflicts of interest, and incorporating the voices of 
service users, was also evident. All the surveyed NGOs, including these three cases, 
invested more in building accountability capital for government and donor demands, 
than for children or carers. They had no formal systems and few informal opportunities 
for accountability to users. Instead they prioritised financial and managerial 
accountability over user accountability. 
Discussion 
Together, these three case-studies exemplified the processes of accumulating stocks of 
accountability capital that could be used to justify legitimacy claims, particularly for 
government and donor audiences. As illustrated in figure 1, these processes had positive 
effects on the development and survival of these cases. In particular they were crucial to 
fostering public and government trust and confidence as legitimate service-providers 
and then attracting donations, expanding their client base, and extracting benefits for 
children in their care and upgrading their professionalism. In all cases developing 
positive relations with the state was important, not just for material resources but also 
for legitimacy from the public, who might donate funds or use services. The stocks of 
accountability capital from informal processes bolstered the formal mechanisms of 
accountability.  
The three NGOs operated in a context of complex politics that both constrained 
the possibilities for development but also created opportunities. Restrictive registration 
regulations along with the reluctance of local officials to act as a supervisory agency 
hampered Liming Family in registering as a child welfare organisation. However it 
seized the opportunity of new regulations in 2013 to register as a disability services 
organisation, though this did not resolve all issues such as the citizenship status of the 
children in its care.  Similarly, Children’s Hope Foundation used the opportunity from 
new regulations to register as a foundation. All three organisations benefited from 
economic growth and the more tolerant approach of some government officials in the 
Hu-Wen period to develop their activities. However, with the new restrictive 2016 
Foreign NGO Management law and government suspicion of foreign-funded NGOs, the 
NGOs faced the risk of less external funding and forfeiting access to international best 




All three case-studies illustrate how building accountability shapes the hierarchy 
of accountabilities, whereby priority is given to financial and managerial accountability 
over downward accountability to users. Whilst donors have the power to withdraw 
funds, users have neither formal mechanisms for seeking accountability nor can they 
easily exit, in a context where the supply of services is limited. Though a user-initiated 
NGO such as Angel House created opportunities for parents to give feedback and 
participate, still, socio-cultural deference to expertise and age affected the hierarchy of 
accountability. Parents defer to professionals, child service-users defer to adults, and 
adults too may not recognise children’s ability or rights to comment on the services they 
receive. In the absence of a child rights’ movement to advocate for children’s rights and 
empower children, the prospects of user accountability are diminished. This is 
particularly relevant in authoritarian regimes where governments fear nationwide 
organising by citizens, and explains in part the lack of articulated accountability 
demands by users in our study. 
Conclusion  
This article set out to develop a generic framework for analysing the processes of 
building accountability and legitimacy by NGOs. It argued that crafting second-order 
accountability to develop stocks of accountability capital was crucial for the 
organisational survival and development of NGOs, particularly those without legal 
status, and for paving a path towards registration in authoritarian contexts. Even where 
an independent NGO gained legal status through registration, its continuation was at the 
discretion of local government officials and subject to political and policy changes. 
Second-order accountability was particularly salient in authoritarian regimes where the 
ex-ante elements of accountability such as basic political rights and protections, an 
enabling regulatory framework, and a vibrant civil society were weak.  
NGOs generated evidence that gave substance to their legitimacy claims and 
provided information to the government, donors, general public and users about their 
purposes, approach and activities. Whether these processes and the generated evidence 
directly caused accountability and legitimacy would require a further study, albeit it 
methodologically difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the success of this continuing, 
incremental process was reflected in the NGO’s development of a client base, 




took place in a political context revolving around broader state-NGO relations, domestic 
and international relations, and power differential amongst stakeholders.  
Together, these processes and context shaped the hierarchy of accountabilities 
that emerged. Specifically, the cases-studies revealed the prioritisation of financial and 
managerial accountability to donors over democratic accountability to users and staff, a 
trend observed in democratic regimes, too. However, in an authoritarian state the 
difficulties of movement-building weakened opportunities for user accountability. Our 
case-studies of child-welfare NGOs exemplified the unfolding of these processes and 
resonate more widely with other service-delivery NGOs. For groups working in 
sensitive areas such as migrants or rights-based advocacy, the constraints on 
organisational growth are more severe due to government repression. Emphasising 
services provision over activism and professionalism over rights was important for 
survival and growth. Whilst the framework sought to capture processes of building 
accountability, it did not seek to provide an assessment of accountability nor an 
empirical study of the politics of exercising accountability. 
The article contributes not only in developing a generic analytic framework but 
also in introducing new concepts such as first-order and second-order accountability, 
and stocks of accountability capital. Though this article focussed on the case of China, 
the framework could be a useful starting-point for in-depth studies of NGO 
accountability and legitimacy in other authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it contributes 
by drawing attention to the multi-dimensionality and multi-directionality of 
accountability hierarchies.  
Looking ahead to the future in China points to a political context that is more 
constraining for some NGOs but facilitative for others. The Xi Jinping era has 
sharpened the application of a welfarist corporatist strategy to civic organising. This 
strategy in Janus-like fashion encourages the development of service-delivery NGOs 
that are instrumentally useful to the state but discourages and represses rights-based, 
advocacy organisations and those deemed to be politically sensitive. Furthermore, 
tightening state control over foreign funding will reduce the amount of foreign funding 
which has been a life-line for some NGOs, and reduce avenues for exposure to 
international best practice in accountability and professional knowledge. The likely 
expansion of acceptable and politically compliant service-delivery NGOs through 
governmental contracting raises concerns around the relative independence of NGOs in 
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